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I.     INTRODUCTION 
Although arbitration clauses in attorney–client retainer agreements are 
enforceable,1 courts across the country continuously struggle with the 
 
1. Watts v. Polaczyk, 619 N.W.2d 714, 717–18 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (holding an arbitration 
clause enforceable in a retainer agreement when the attorney advised the client in writing to obtain 
independent counsel before signing the agreement); Chambers v. O’Quinn, 305 S.W.3d 141, 148 
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undecided question of whether the attorney is required to fully apprise the 
client of the legal consequences of such a clause.2  State courts take various 
viewpoints on the issue, and most stand contrary to the position of the 
American Bar Association and state ethics committee opinions on the 
subject.3  Consequently, attorneys must disclose truthful and accurate 
information regarding arbitration agreements when engaged in multi-
jurisdictional practice in order to ensure their protection from malpractice 
liability.4 
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently stretched this requirement to 
place a heavy burden on the attorney in Hodges v. Reasonover.5  The court 
 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“[A]rbitration agreements are enforceable in the 
context of a legal malpractice suit.”).  But see In re Godt, 28 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 2000, no pet.) (striking down an arbitration clause in an attorney–client contract because it 
referenced both federal and state arbitration laws). 
2. See Desert Outdoor Adver. v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 163–65 (Ct. App. 
2011) (concluding the arbitration clause in the retainer agreement was “readily discernible and clear” 
therefore, further disclosure by the attorney was not required).  Compare Hodges v. Reasonover, 103 
So. 3d 1069, 1078 (La. 2012) (requiring attorneys to fully disclose the scope, terms, and legal 
consequences of the arbitration clause), with Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP v. Forier, 
67 So. 3d 315, 318–19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (stating there is no legal authority that either 
prohibits arbitration clauses in retainer agreements or mandates what level of disclosure about the 
consequences is desirable), and Haynes v. Kuder, 591 A.2d 1286, 1290–91 (D.C. 1991) (“Although 
in deciding this issue we touch on substantial ethical concerns, and the written agreement was 
somewhat terse in explaining the rights [the client] would relinquish by agreeing to arbitration, we 
agree with the trial judge that the written disclosure was sufficient to negate the claim of fraudulent 
inducement as a matter of law.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
3. Compare Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1290–92 (providing although the language of the arbitration 
clause did not expressly describe the waiver to a jury trial, the client was reasonably informed of the 
clause’s application), with ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002) 
(opining clients must receive information about the possible benefits and consequences of arbitration 
to enable them to make an informed decision about the provision), and Tex. Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics, Op. No. 586 (2008) (agreeing the lawyer should inform the client about the advantages and 
disadvantages of arbitration, but only “to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary”).  The 
District of Columbia Legal Ethics Committee originally encouraged greater disclosure about the 
ramifications of arbitration, but subsequently revised its opinion; it concluded that a separate attorney 
must counsel the client regarding arbitration.  D.C. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990) 
(“Therefore, we now conclude that Opinion 190 was incorrect in supposing that adequate disclosures 
concerning mandatory arbitration could be made to lay clients.  Accordingly, mandatory arbitration 
agreements covering all disputes between lawyer and client are not permitted under either our prior 
Opinions or Rule 1.8(a) unless the client is in fact counseled by another attorney.”). 
4. See generally Louis A. Russo, Note, The Consequences of Arbitrating a Legal Malpractice 
Claim: Rebuilding Faith in the Legal Profession, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 327, 344–60 (categorizing 
states’ handling of malpractice arbitration into two groups: those that require the client to consult 
with independent counsel, and those that require the attorney to disclose the consequences of 
arbitration to the client). 
5. Hodges v. Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069 (La. 2012); see also State Bar of Ariz., Ethics Op. 
94-05 (1994) (opining the attorney should disclose the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration in 
the agreement, but not listing them specifically). 
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balanced two integral policies: the favorability of the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses in contract law against the fiduciary duties an attorney 
owes his client.6  The court not only mandated the attorney’s disclosure of 
the arbitration clause, but also listed a minimum number of legal 
consequences stemming from the arbitration clause that the client must be 
aware of before signing the retainer agreement.7  The concurring and 
dissenting opinions offered special insight into the potential problems with 
the majority’s ruling.8  While the standard dictated by the majority 
opinion far exceeds those found in other jurisdictions, an attorney can 
curtail legal malpractice claims by including the legal benefits and 
consequences of arbitration in the retainer agreement.  The extent of the 
fiduciary duties owed by the attorney to a prospective client, however, 
remains an open question.9 
Part II of this Case Summary will walk through the facts of the case and 
analyze the majority, concurrence, and dissenting opinions.  Part III will 
explore and balance the pros and cons of arbitration, and Part IV will 
analyze the relevant Model Rules applicable to fee agreements.  Finally, 
Part V will offer advice to attorneys counseling clients about the 
ramifications of arbitration clauses in fee retainer agreements. 
II.     CASE SUMMARY 
The facts of Hodges are straightforward: the Hodges originally retained 
the Reasonover & Olinde law firm to sue MedAssets in federal court.10  
The Hodges signed a retainer agreement containing an arbitration 
clause.11  Two years into the dispute, the Hodges requested the fee 
arrangement in the retainer be changed from a blended fee schedule to a 
pure contingency fee.12  The revised agreement contained the same 
arbitration clause as the original, and the attorneys advised the Hodges to 
 
6. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1072–73. 
7. Id. at 1077. 
8. See generally id. at 1079–83 (providing two concurring opinions and a dissenting opinion). 
9. See Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 586 (2008) (specifying that Texas Disciplinary 
Rule 1.03(b), which requires a lawyer to reasonably explain matters affecting representation to their 
client, applies only when a prospective client signs a retainer agreement with an arbitration clause).  
The Committee also distinguished between clients that have differing levels of experience and 
sophistication.  Id.; accord ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002) 
(“Depending on the sophistication of the client[,] . . . the lawyer should explain the possible adverse 
consequences as well as the benefits arising from execution of the agreement.”). 
10. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1071. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 1072. 
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seek independent counsel before signing the agreement.13  The claims 
against MedAssets proved unsuccessful, and the Hodges sued the firm for 
legal malpractice.14  Both the district court and the appellate court ruled 
against enforcing the arbitration clause, labeling it a “prospective limitation 
of liability.”15 
A. The Majority’s Balancing Act 
In the court’s reasoning, the Louisiana Supreme Court first outlined the 
commonly held principle that public policy favors arbitration.16  Although 
an issue of first impression in Louisiana, the court recognized the American 
Bar Association Ethics Committee, along with various state bar ethics 
committees, enforce agreed-upon arbitration clauses in attorney–client 
retainer agreements.17  The Hodges conceded the arbitration clause did 
not prospectively limit the attorney’s liability, but argued that mandatory 
arbitration imposed “unreasonable procedural barriers” on clients.18  
Particularly, the Hodges contended that the upfront cost of arbitration 
simultaneously deters litigants from entering the arbitration stage and 
shields the attorney from malpractice claims.19  The court dismissed this 
argument by underlining the option for a waiver of the initial filing fee 





16. Id.; see also Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney–Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate 
Guidelines for Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2002) (acknowledging the 
federal policy of favoring arbitration clauses, but expressing skepticism at the inclusion of such clauses 
in adhesion contracts).  See generally Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475–76 (1989) (declaring ambiguities in arbitration clauses should be viewed in 
the clause’s favor); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1983) (describing the Federal Arbitration Act as “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements”).  The Federal Arbitration Act preempts any state law on the 
subject.  West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Lane Indus., Inc., 201 S.E.2d 452, 453 (Ga. 1973) 
(“Where such a transaction involves commerce, within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration 
Statute, the state law and policy with respect thereto must yield to the paramount federal law.” (citing 
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Airport, 269 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 1959))). 
17. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1072; ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 
02­425 (2002); State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. RI-257 (1996).  
The public policy favoring arbitration clauses stems from the “duty to read” maxim of contract law.  
See generally Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of 
Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 275 (1990) (“The typical doctrinal shorthand for this 
view is that the buyer has a ‘duty to read’ the contract; if she neglects this duty she waives her 
objection to the consequences.”). 
18. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1074. 
19. Id. at 1074–75. 
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between the upfront cost and the efficiency of arbitration.20  The court 
further stated that an arbitration clause generally does not limit the 
substantive rights of either party; rather, the arbitration clause is best 
viewed as an alternative method of dispute resolution.21  Thus, the court 
concluded, these clauses do not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and are enforceable.22 
In their second argument before the court, the Hodges asserted their 
attorney did not sufficiently disclose the full extent of the legal 
consequences that accompanied the arbitration clause and maintained that 
the clause was unenforceable.23  In response to this argument, the court 
completely changed its focus from the clause’s enforceability to the 
fiduciary duties owed to a prospective client by an attorney.24 
“‘The relation of attorney and client is more than a contract.  It 
superinduces a trust status of the highest order and devolves upon the 
attorney the imperative duty of dealing with the client on the basis of 
strictest fidelity and honor.’”25  As a result, retainer agreements between 
attorneys and their clients are traditionally interpreted with strict scrutiny 
to correspond with the attorney’s fiduciary duties.26 
The court started by exploring the fiduciary duties of candor and 
loyalty.27  Drawing from the definition and rules governing informed 
consent,28 the court reasoned that the client may only make an informed 
 
20. Id.  The court specifically pointed to AAA’s waiver of initial filing fees for those 200% 
below the poverty line, and emphasized that arbitration “streamline[s] discovery,” saving both time 
and money.  Id. at 1075. 
21. Id. at 1076. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 1077. 
25. Id. at 1073 (quoting Teague v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 974 So. 2d 1266, 1271 
(La. 2008)).  The trend of bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim is on the rise, but the actual 
phrase still lacks a precise definition.  See Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of 
Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
135, 141–46 (2008) (explaining a breach of fiduciary duty may involve a breach of multiple duties 
because of the lack of a strict definition). 
26. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1073 (“At the same time, agreements between law firms and clients 
are held to higher scrutiny than normal commercial contracts because of the fiduciary duties 
involved.”); Jean Fleming Powers, Ethical Implications of Attorneys Requiring Clients to Submit 
Malpractice Claims to ADR, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 646 (1997). 
27. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1077. 
28. Id.  According to Rule 1.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer must 
explain the legal effects of any decision related to the client’s representation “to the extent reasonably 
necessary.”  ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
53 (7th ed. 2011) (emphasis added).  This language has been interpreted to include arbitration 
agreements in attorney–client retainer agreements.  Id. at 63 (citing Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 
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decision about the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the retainer 
agreement if the significant legal consequences are fully explained to the 
client.29  Reversing its earlier assessment, the court leaned on the long-
standing Louisiana tradition that attorneys should inform their clients of 
consequences associated with contracts that “negatively affect the client’s 
rights.”30  Attorneys, the court reasoned, hold an unfair advantage over 
their clients who do not understand the inner workings of the legal 
system.31  The court then mandated that when entering a retainer 
agreement with a client, the attorney must inform the client of: the waiver 
of a jury trial, the waiver of appeal, the waiver of broad discovery, the 
upfront costs of arbitration, the claims covered by the clause, the client’s 
continued right to report the attorney to the state disciplinary committee, 
and the client’s right to seek separate counsel about the clause.32  The 
court thus concluded the attorneys in Hodges failed to meet the disclosure 
requirements and invalidated the arbitration clause.33  Though this 
seemed to be a victory for the clients, the decision carries broad 
implications for current industry practice.34 
B. The Concurrence’s Preemptive Timing Trap 
Justice Weimer’s concurrence generally agreed with the majority’s view 
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements, but disagreed with the level 
of disclosure required of the attorney.35  Specifically, he points to a 
“potential [preemptive] trap” that could affect a client’s malpractice 
claim.36  Louisiana law dictates a one-year uninterrupted time limit on 
 
Op. No. 586 (2008)). 
29. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1077 (“Inherent in these duties is the principle that an attorney 
cannot take any action adversely affecting the client’s interest unless the client has been fully apprised, 
to the extent reasonably practicable, of the risks and possible consequences thereof—that is, the client 
must give informed consent.”). 
30. Id.  But see id. at 1074 (stating arbitration clauses do not substantially affect the rights of 
either party). 
31. Id. at 1077. 
32. Id. at 1077. 
33. Id. at 1078.  The court further held the attorney’s duty does not depend on the client’s 
sophistication.  Id.  But see ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002) 
(striking a compromise between the lawyer’s expertise and the client’s sophistication by 
recommending the attorney explain the legal ramifications “to the extent necessary,” with the caveat 
that a mandatory arbitration clause is only allowed when accompanied by full disclosure of the legal 
consequences). 
34. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1079 (Victory, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority’s expansion of 
disclosure duties owed by an attorney). 
35. Id. at 1080 (Weimer, J., concurring). 
36. Id. 
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legal malpractice claims; therefore, if arbitration is not concluded within 
one year of the alleged malpractice, it is arguable that the client’s claim will 
be barred.37  Viewed in this light, no arbitration clause treats these claims 
fairly.38  States have various statutes of limitation periods on legal 
malpractice claims, but this argument potentially applies to all jurisdictions 
because of the lengthy nature of arbitration.39  There is a valid argument 
based on public policy that clients should be informed of this timing trap 
prior to signing a retainer agreement containing an arbitration clause. 
C. The Dissent’s Independent Counsel Option 
Justice Victory relied upon the fundamentals of contract law in his 
dissenting opinion.40  Victory concluded the arbitration clause in the 
retainer agreement contained plain, unambiguous language; therefore, it 
was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act and local Louisiana 
law.41  The Hodges testified the attorney advised them to consult with 
independent counsel before agreeing to the arbitration clause.42  Though 
Justice Victory acknowledged the importance of the attorney–client 
relationship,43 he emphasized the purpose of advising clients to consult 
with independent counsel: to provide the client with the option of 
reviewing the legal ramifications of arbitration with a neutral attorney.44  
Therefore, under the dissent’s analysis, Mr. Reasonover performed 
everything legally required of him.45  However, this argument relies on the 
assumption that the mere offer of independent counsel would cause a 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 1082.  Justice Weimer also defers this issue to the legislature, stating: “If the 
legislature wishes to allow the initiation of an arbitration to be the functional equivalent of filing a 
lawsuit[,] . . . the legislature could amend the law.”  Id. at 1083. 
39. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 2010) (fixing a one-year time period on 
legal malpractice claims); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.3 (1956) (setting a three-year statute of 
limitations on legal malpractice claims); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (West 
Supp. 2012) (establishing a two-year limit on malpractice actions). 
40. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1079–80 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
41. Id. at 1080.  The clause itself specifically designated that it covered any dispute.  Id. 
42. Id. at 1079. 
43. Id. at 1080.  The attorney–client relationship is fiduciary; it arises out of the client’s 
complete reliance and trust in the attorney.  Courts generally hold agreements between attorneys and 
their clients to a higher standard because of this special relationship and the unequal bargaining 
power of the parties.  See generally Matthew J. Clark, Note, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Pre-
Dispute Agreements Between Attorneys and Clients to Arbitrate Fee Disputes, 84 IOWA L. REV. 827, 
844–45 (1999) (describing the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship and applying it to 
arbitration disputes). 
44. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1080 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. 
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reasonable person to infer that arbitration carries adverse legal 
implications. 
III.     THE UNSPOKEN BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION 
As with any legal action, arbitration carries potential benefits and 
consequences.46  The Hodges opinion lists the potential consequences in 
explicit detail, but makes no mention of the possible benefits of 
arbitration.  Even if not required to do so, it would make sense for 
attorneys to inform their clients of the possible advantages of arbitration.  
For the legal system as a whole, arbitration provides an alternative way to 
resolve disputes, thus removing cases from clogged courts.47  For the 
client, the legal consequences accompanying arbitration may also be 
potentially beneficial.48  For example, there are corollary advantages to 
waiving the right to a jury trial; arbitration provides one qualified decision-
maker, and hearings take less time because there is no need to manage a 
jury.49  Though there are upfront costs to arbitration, evidentiary and 
procedural complications are non-existent because arbitration hearings are 
informal, thus making the overall cost of arbitration much less than 
malpractice litigation.50  The shorter time span and confidential nature of 
arbitration proceedings also maintain more privacy than public litigation 
proceedings.51 
Just as there are pros and cons for the client to consider, the attorney 
 
46. See generally Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 204–10 (1996) (exploring the benefits and perceived drawbacks of 
arbitration). 
47. Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1672 
(1996) (considering the benefits of arbitration). 
48. Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney–Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate Guidelines for 
Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (2002) (identifying elements of arbitration that 
may be appealing to clients). 
49. Thomas B. Metzoff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 203, 208 (1996).  Though Metzoff’s article mainly focuses on medical malpractice litigation, 
the principles are directly applicable to the realm of legal malpractice.  Id. 
50. See id. (explaining arbitration hearings reduce costs because “there is no need to select, 
instruct, or manage a jury” and “conflicts over evidentiary issues are minimized because arbitration 
hearings are typically less formal than a jury trial”). 
51. Id. at 209.  Metzoff also explores the use of experts in arbitration proceedings, concluding 
the use of neutral experts in arbitration hearings is preferable over the “expert fights” one encounters 
in malpractice litigation.  Id. at 209–10.  But see Bruce A. Rubin & Jennifer J. Roof, A Contrarian’s 
Checklist to Arbitration Clauses, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 242, 242–46 (2007) (counter-arguing that 
arbitrators, who are often retired judges or lawyers, charge by the hour, could potentially stretch the 
arbitration process over a longer time span than litigation, and that the confidentiality of arbitration 
is only temporary in nature). 
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must also weigh the benefits and consequences of arbitration.52  Many 
attorneys are reluctant to include arbitration clauses in their retainer 
agreements because of the finality of the proceedings and the potential 
embarrassment of subjecting their administrative practices to the 
arbitrator’s scrutiny.53  The attorney must weigh these negative attributes 
of arbitration against the negative aspects of malpractice litigation.54  
These consequences include harm to the attorney’s reputation and the cost 
of the litigation process.55  Like most choices in the legal profession, 
neither choice is legally wrong; the attorney must simply determine 
whether to include an arbitration clause in retainer agreements with his 
clients. 
IV.     FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND DISCLOSURE: FACTORS TO CONSIDER 
A.  Rule 1.8: Prospective Limitation of Liability56 
The debate concerning arbitration clauses in attorney–client retainer 
agreements originally centered on Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.8(h)(1), which states, “A lawyer shall not . . . make an agreement 
prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the 
client is independently represented in making the agreement.”57  The 
ABA and the courts eventually concluded arbitration agreements do not 
violate this rule.58  Comment 14 to Rule 1.8 explicitly states that “[t]his 
paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an 
agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided 
 
52. See generally Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney–Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate 
Guidelines for Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1217 (2002) (summarizing concerns 
attorneys should ponder before choosing to include an arbitration clause in their retainer 
agreements). 
53. Id. at 1218. 
54. In general, arbitration is more efficient, informal, and private; litigation is generally more 
thorough and final.  Id. at 1217–18. 
55. Id. 
56. See E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 133–34 (6th ed. 2007) (listing the provisions of Rule 1.8—specific rules regarding 
conflicts of interest with current clients); see also Chambers v. O’Quinn, 305 S.W.3d 141, 150 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (explaining the parallel rule in the Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct and holding that “the arbitration clause in the instant case does not 
limit the liability to which appellees would otherwise be exposed, and therefore it does not violate 
[the Texas Disciplinary Rules]”). 
57. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
134 (6th ed. 2007) (emphasis added). 
58. Id. at 138 cmt. 15 (“Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not 
prohibited by this Rule.”). 
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such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the 
scope and effect of the agreement.”59  After overcoming the enforceability 
obstacle, attorneys wishing to include arbitration clauses in retainer 
agreements encountered another problem: to what degree should the client 
be apprised of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration? 
The dispute over this question shifted the focus in the Model Rules.  
The duty of loyalty requires lawyers to screen for potential conflicts of 
interest among current and former clients.60  This duty of loyalty also 
encompasses the confidentiality obligation between lawyers and clients.61  
However, in some instances, the duty of loyalty differs for prospective 
clients from current and former clients; for example, a lawyer will only be 
barred from representing a client with an adverse interest to a former 
potential client if the former potential client revealed information “that 
could be significantly harmful to him.”62  This treatment suggests certain 
duties to prospective clients are diminished when other rights or factors are 
at play.63  Therefore, whether a client is current or prospective could 
potentially determine the level of required disclosure and the legal 
consequences of a binding arbitration clause in the attorney’s retainer 
agreement. 
B.  Rule 1.4: Communication64 
Communication is paramount to the overall quality of the attorney–
client relationship.65  Rule 1.4 governs communication in the client–
 
59. Id. at 138 cmt. 14.  Comment 15 expands upon this statement by requiring a lawyer to 
inform the client in writing of their option to consult independent counsel.  Id. at 138 cmt. 15. 
60. Id. at 160–61 (discussing how to determine if the client should be categorized as a “former” 
client). 
61. ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
280 (7th ed. 2011) (emphasizing the scope of the confidentiality obligation: it does not end because a 
prospective client did not retain the lawyer for representation). 
62. Id. at 281.  A similar Rule applies to short-term legal service attorneys.  Id. at 165, 529–31 
(eliminating the attorney’s obligation to check for conflicts of interest when rendering limited legal 
services). 
63. See id. at 280 (“Although a lawyer may neither use nor reveal information relating to the 
representation of a current client, she may use information relating to the representation of a former 
client once it is generally known.”). 
64. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
53 (6th ed. 2007). 
65. Ursula H. Weigold, The Attorney–Client Privilege As an Obstacle to the Professional and 
Ethical Development of Law Students, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 677, 681–82 (2006) (characterizing 
communication as a “necessary lawyering skill” and describing numerous situations where successful 
lawyers must be capable of effective communication). 
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lawyer relationship.66  Specifically, subsection (b) states, “A lawyer shall 
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to 
make informed decisions regarding the representation.”67  Thus, it makes 
logical sense that the decision of whether to agree to a retainer agreement is 
a decision regarding the representation.  However, Comment 5 seemingly 
narrows the scope of part (b).68  It also further clarifies the issue by stating 
that the “[a]dequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of 
advice or assistance that is involved.”69  The comment expands on 
communication involving the objective of representation, but not on 
preliminary or initial agreements concerning the attorney–client 
relationship.70  The annotated version of the rules, however, includes a 
broad discussion about communicating adverse consequences and refers to 
mandatory arbitration clauses in retainer agreements.71  Though the ABA 
Model Rules do not carry the force of law, they are controlling and 
enforceable in jurisdictions that adopt the Model Rules.72 
C.  Rule 1.5: Fees73 
In a comment to Rule 1.5 that relates to fees, the ABA gives each state 
bar the ultimate power to regulate the disclosure procedure in arbitration 
disputes regarding fees.74  Therefore, the guidance in the Model Rules is 
 
66. Id. at 681–83. 
67. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
53 (6th ed. 2007). 
68. Id. at 54. 
69. ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 54 
cmt. 5 (7th ed. 2011). 
70. Id. 
71. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
63 (6th ed. 2007) (“Accordingly, a lawyer must explain the legal effect of entering an agreement or 
executing a legal document.”).  While this seems to contradict the scope of Comment 5, Rule 1.4(b) 
on its face is broad enough in its language to encompass all interactions and decisions between 
attorney and client. 
72. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The 
Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 298 (1992) 
(“Although the profession initially formulates ethics rules in an attempt at self-regulation, it is the 
courts that, as external governors of the profession, must give ethics rules the force of law in 
disciplinary proceedings.  Likewise, courts must decide whether and to what extent ethics rules have 
authoritative force in other contexts.”). 
73. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
65 (6th ed. 2007). 
74. “If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or 
mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is 
mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to 
it.”  E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 68 
cmt. 9 (6th ed. 2007). 
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not mandatory. 
D.  ABA and State Ethics Committees 
ABA and state ethics committee opinions attempt to untangle the 
arbitration problem, but often only contribute to the confusion.  In a 2002 
formal opinion, the ABA expressed concern about clients’ ability to 
appreciate the consequences of arbitration.75  The ABA opined that clients 
must be sufficiently informed to be able to make a proper decision about 
whether to submit to a mandatory binding arbitration clause in a fee 
retainer.76  The ABA derived this conclusion from Rules 1.4(b) and 1.7, 
combining the lawyer’s fiduciary duty to explain properly legal 
ramifications involved in a client’s representation and the lawyer’s duty to 
resolve conflicts of interest with the client’s informed consent to create an 
ethically permissible technique for including arbitration clauses in retainer 
agreements.77  
     It is ethically permissible to include in a retainer agreement with a client a 
provision that requires the binding arbitration of fee disputes and 
malpractice claims provided that (1) the client has been fully apprised of the 
advantages and disadvantages of arbitration and has been given sufficient 
information to permit her to make an informed decision about whether to 
agree to the inclusion of the arbitration provision in the retainer agreement, 
and (2) the arbitration provision does not insulate the lawyer from liability 
or limit the liability to which she would otherwise be exposed under 
common [or] statutory law.78  
In contrast to the ABA’s fullest disclosure stance, the District of 
Columbia Bar issued an opinion retracting its previous position on the 
 
75. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002). 
76. Id.  See also Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney–Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate 
Guidelines for Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1219–22 (2002) (analyzing the various 
concerns clients have when deciding on an arbitration clause). 
77. The Opinion further postulates an arbitration clause mandatory in nature represents a 
conflict of interest “that can be neutralized only by the lawyer providing full disclosure and an 
explanation sufficient ‘to permit the client to make an informed decision’ about whether to agree to a 
binding arbitration provision.”  ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 
(2002); accord N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, Ethics Op. 723 (1997) (“[A] lawyer may ethically include 
a condition in a retainer agreement requiring that all disputes . . . be subject to arbitration . . . 
provided that the lawyer fully discloses the consequences of that condition to the client and allows the 
client the opportunity, should the client so choose, to seek independent counsel regarding the 
provision.”). 
78. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002) (emphasis added).  
The opinion also clarifies the prior opinions regarding Rule 1.4(b) construed the Rule as relating to 
the matter of representation, but Opinion 02-425 extends Rule 1.4(b) to the attorney–client 
relationship. Id. at n.13. 
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matter.79  D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion 190 expressed the need for full 
disclosure of the legal consequences of arbitration clauses in retainer 
agreements with clients.80  Subsequently, in Opinion 211, the D.C. Bar 
completely reversed its position, stating, “Opinion 190 was incorrect in its 
belief that the complex nature of arbitration could be adequately disclosed 
to a lay client.”81  Therefore, the D.C. Bar concluded that full disclosure is 
an unrealistic expectation because of the flexible nature of the arbitration 
procedure and the many factors affecting it.82  The Bar removed the 
disclosure requirement and instead mandated that the client seek counsel 
from an independent attorney before signing the agreement.83  The D.C. 
Rules of Professional Conduct were subsequently changed a second time in 
2007; the amendment removed the requirement for advice from inde-
pendent counsel under Rule 1.5.84  The District of Columbia made a 
complete circle, turning from mandatory full disclosure, to the necessity of 
independent counsel, to no requirements at all. 
The Texas Professional Ethics Committee issued an opinion that 
attempted to find a middle ground between full disclosure and none at 
all—the Committee suggested the lawyer should explain the benefits and 
consequences of arbitration to the client “to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes is necessary.”85  Additionally, the opinion considers the 
sophistication of the client when discerning the level of disclosure required.  
For example, the opinion specifies that when the client is a large business 
entity, disclosure may not be necessary.86  However, the opinion also 
 
79. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990). 
80. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 190 (1988). 
81. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990). 
82. Id. 
83. Id.  Two members dissented, arguing an attorney can summarize effectively the legal 
consequences and the basic nature of arbitration proceedings.  Id.  The dissent leans primarily on the 
AAA, emphasizing the easy accessibility of information related to arbitration.  Id.; see also AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO AAA ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION (2007), 
available at https://www.aaau.org/resources/adr-resources (explaining each stage of mediation and 
arbitration proceedings). 
84. Opinions Substantively Affected by the Amended Rules (Effective 2/1/07), D.C. BAR, 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion_table.cfm (last visited Dec. 
28, 2012). 
85. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 586 (2008) (emphasis added).  One year after the 
release of this Opinion, a Houston Court of Appeals punted the issue of the enforceability of 
arbitration to the legislature.  Chambers v. O’Quinn, 305 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“The legislature’s failure to impose such conditions on attorney–client 
contracts, while expressly recognizing them in other contexts, indicates that the legislature did not 
intend to impose such conditions.”). 
86. Id.; see also Desert Outdoor Adver. v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 164 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (holding an attorney had no duty to separately disclose the arbitration clause and its 
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clarified that the Committee did not possess the power necessary to answer 
substantive questions about arbitration clauses in attorney–client 
agreements.87  While the “reasonably necessary” standard logically entrusts 
lawyers with the judgment whether to consult the client about the 
arbitration clause, it is difficult to enforce because each case must be 
analyzed on its own individual facts.88 
VI.     PROTECTING AGAINST LIABILITY 
Due to the variety of approaches jurisdictions employ when determining 
the disclosure of the legal ramifications of arbitration clauses in fee retainer 
agreements, the best practice is perhaps the most obvious: explicit 
inclusion of the legal consequences of arbitration into the agreement itself.  
The attorney can, and should, fully explain the potential benefits of 
arbitration to the client.  Attorneys engaged in multi-jurisdictional practice 
should pay special attention to the required disclosure in each state that 
could affect liability.89 
Though this issue will undoubtedly continue to surface, attorneys 
should always remember to consider their clients first and foremost; proper 
practice ensures that the client makes an informed decision on the matter 
of binding arbitration clauses. 
 
 
consequences after analyzing the following factors: the client’s sophistication; the attorney’s 
encouragement for the client to seek independent counsel; the client’s corrections to other parts of 
the agreement; and a cover letter notating a new retainer agreement and drawing the client’s attention 
to new provisions); Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 267–68 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (emphasizing the difference between an initial and an existing client’s expectations, and 
the effect on the attorney’s fiduciary obligations). 
87. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 586 (2008) (“It is beyond the authority of this 
Committee to address questions of substantive law relating to the validity of arbitration clauses in 
agreements between lawyers and their clients.”). 
88. See also Desert Outdoor Adver., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 163 (stating specific factors of each case 
affect the fiduciary’s obligations). 
89. See Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP v. Forier, 67 So. 3d 315, 318–319 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“While there are arguably ethical issues that arise in this type of contract, there 
is currently no Florida Bar Rule which prohibits this sort of agreement.”); State Bar of Ariz., Ethics 
Op. 94-05 (1994) (providing an arbitration clause may be included in an attorney–client fee 
agreement if: the clause is reasonable, the clause discloses both the advantages and the disadvantages 
of arbitration, the attorney encourages the client to seek independent counsel, and the client consents 
in writing); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 170 (1999) (permitting the inclusion of arbitration 
clauses in attorney–client fee arrangements); Vt. Advisory Ethics Op. 2003-07 (2003) (allowing 
arbitration clauses in fee arrangements if the attorney encourages the client to consult independent 
counsel). 
